Additional Protocol To The Iaea Safeguards Agreement

The five nuclear-weapon States of nuclear non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have entered into safeguard agreements for some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. As part of these voluntary supply agreements, agencies are notified by the State concerned to the IAEA and offered for the application of safeguard measures. The IAEA applies safeguards under voluntary agreements to supply nuclear materials at selected facilities. In late 1993, the IAEA launched a comprehensive programme to further strengthen the implementation of security arrangements under the CSA, improving the IAEA`s ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities. As part of the `93-2 programme`, measures to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA guarantees for CSA member countries were submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors. In 2018, the IAEA has developed state-level approaches for five other countries, bringing the total number of countries with a comprehensive protection agreement and a state-level approach to 130. According to the IAEA in 2018, “these 130 states hold 97% of all (large-scale) nuclear materials in states that have entered into a comprehensive protection agreement under the Agency`s safeguards. The small quantity protocol is a protocol that can be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive guarantee agreement. It has been available since 1971 and its text was standardized in 1974 (initial protocol on small quantities). Within the global nuclear non-proliferation system, the IAEA security system serves as a confidence-building measure, early warning mechanism and trigger that triggers further reactions from the international community when necessary. The IAEA conducts various types of inspections and on-site visits under comprehensive protection agreements. The IAEA safeguards do not prohibit additional bilateral or multilateral safeguards.

For example, in 1991, Brazil and Argentina concluded an agreement on bilateral security inspections (ABACC) and Euratom safeguards that preceded the NPT requirement and contribute to the protection agreements negotiated by their Member States with the Agency. The additional protocol is not a stand-alone agreement, but a protocol to a guarantee agreement that provides additional instruments for verification. In particular, it increases the IAEA`s ability to examine the peaceful use of nuclear materials in states that have comprehensive safeguard agreements. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began in 1993 to try to better limit the ability of NPT member states to illegally pursue nuclear weapons, after secret nuclear weapons programmes in Iraq and North Korea revealed weaknesses in existing security arrangements by the authorities. In addition to strengthening safeguards through the adoption of the Additional Protocol model in the late 1990s and 2000s, the IAEA has also developed methods to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of implementing safeguards for states where CSAs and APS are in force. The IAEA has launched a “state-level approach” to assess state compliance with protection agreements in a comprehensive manner and not on the basis of a facility of establishment. It has also begun to adopt “broader conclusions” for states in order to facilitate the burden of implementation by applying the approach at the national level.